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COMMENTS
Reforming Criminal Sentencing in Wyoming
Wyoming Supreme Court Justice Rose has recently stated that the
court is "in the throes of attempting to delineate sentencing standards."'
Currently there are no sentencing standards in Wyoming other than the
"standards" which can be gleaned from the supreme court's decisions
which deal with sentencing.' An analysis of these decisions, however,
reveals that they fail to give any clear guidance to the lower courts. Justice
Rose is correct when he states that Wyoming needs sentencing standards.
Without standards, disparity in sentencing decisions has been, and will
continue to be, a problem in Wyoming.s Without standards, the state does
not fully achieve its sentencing goals.
The supreme court should delineate sentencing standards. A clear set
of sentencing standards would help to achieve the goals of sentencing and
would also reduce disparity. The supreme court could best delineate
sentencing standards by adopting mandatory judicial guidelines. Such
guidelines would structure and limit, but would not eliminate, the discretion currently exercised by sentencing judges in Wyoming.
The goals of sentencing have changed throughout the past two centuries. In the period following the American revolution, legal sanctions
were usually applied uniformly to the guilty, without regard to aggravating or mitigating factors. Little individualization was permitted.
Individualization later became an important aspect of sentencing. In order
to help achieve the goal of individualization states looked to indeterminate
sentencing. By 1922 thirty-seven states had adopted some form of indeterminate sentencing.4 Indeterminate sentencing is a form of sentencing in
which a definite term is not fixed by the court but is left to the determination of penal authorities within the minimum and maximum period
fixed by the court.' Indeterminate sentencing is the dominant sentencing structure in the United States today.6
The indeterminate sentence is the result of the shifting policy toward
individualizing sentencing. This shift was a result of the increasing emphasis on rehabilitation as a primary goal of criminal sentencing. The indefinite term is an important mechanism to encourage inmate participa1. Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374, 376 (Wyo. 1984).
2. The Wyoming Supreme Court will review any sentence imposed under an "abuse
of discretion" standard. See infra text accompanying notes 27-44.
3. Roberts, The Changing Structure of Criminal Sentencing, 18 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 592 (1983).
4.

THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DEFINITE SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION

OF PROPOSALS IN FoUR STATES 3-5
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

(1976). (hereinafter cited as

DEFINITE

SENTENCING].

694 (5th ed. 1979).
6. Dershowitz, BackgroundPaper,in FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (Twentieth Cen-

tury Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing 1976).
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tion in treatment programs because the length of imprisonment is determined by the inmate's responsiveness to treatment programs.7
Wyoming's sentencing structure is based on the indeterminate
sentence.' Not only do the Wyoming statutes provide for indeterminate
sentences, they also provide for very large ranges for some crimes. For
example, first degree sexual assualt is punishable by imprisonment for
not less than five nor more than fifty years.' In addition, the range of actual imprisonment can be varied to a greater extent by placing the offender on probation) ° Thus, in Wyoming a person who commits first
degree sexual assualt may be sentenced to as little as five years of probation or to as much as fifty years in prison.
What guidelines are available to help the sentencing judge in Wyoming determine the appropriate penalty for a particular offender? The only
real guidance is contained in the Wyoming Constitution which proclaims
that the penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and prevention. 2 Within these broad parameters a judge can rely on
the general aims of sentencing in order to determine an appropriate
sentence.
SENTENCING GoALs

The general body of criminology literature reveals that sentencing is
aimed at accomplishing four different goals: retribution, incapacitation,
deterrence, and rehabilitation. 3 The Wyoming Supreme Court has held
that all four of4 these goals are legitimate objectives under the Wyoming
Constitution."
Retribution or punishment is a sentencing goal which has received
increased attention in recent years." Retribution is not based on personal
vengeance and revenge but is society extracting the threatened penalty
for failure to comply with its rules. 6 An example of the recent emphasis
on retribution is California's penal code, which has explicitly stated that
punishment is the primary goal of its Determinate Sentencing Law."
7. DEFINITE SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 7. In Wyoming the indeterminate sentencing structure has some features which modify the above statement to some extent. See
Roberts, supra note 3.

8. WYo. STAT. § 7-13-201 (1977) provides in part: "Tihe court imposing the sentence
shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment...."
9. WYO. STAT. § 6-2-306(a)(i) (June, 1983 replacement).
10. WYo. STAT. § 7-13-301 (1977) authorizes the court to grant probation except for
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. See infra text accompanying notes 97-116.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has noted that probation is constructive confinement. See
infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
11. Roberts, supra note 3, at 607.
12. WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
13. DEFINITE SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 11.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
15. See, e.g., Bayley, Good Intentions Gone Awry -A Proposalfor FundamentalChanges
in CriminalSentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV. 529 (1976).
16. Id at 550.
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(i) (West Supp. 1982). For an analysis of California's
system see Von Hirsch & Mueller, California'sDeterminate Sentencing Law: An Analysis
of its Structure, 10 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 253 (1984).
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A second major goal of sentencing is deterrence. Deterrence consists
of both specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence is achieved
by the actual punishment of the individual. General deterrence is not
achieved by punishing an individual, but is achieved through the threat
of punishment to all members of society. 8 The certainty, and not necessarily the severity, of punishment is the necessary attribute of a sentencing
system with deterrence as its goal. 9
Another goal of sentencing is incapacitation. Through incapacitation
the primary objective of reducing the frequency and/or severity of criminal
acts is achieved by simply keeping potential actors isolated from society.
Incapacitation is based on the premise that an offender will commit
another crime after he is released.2"
Finally, the most important goal of sentencing in many penal codes
is rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is based on the premise that the offender's
behavior has been shaped by social forces beyond his control and sanctions should be applied as they are needed to modify this behavior.,' Indeterminate sentencing has been viewed as vital to the goal of rehabilitation. 2
It is important to note the goals of sentencing because part of the
difficulty in sentencing decisions is that these goals often conflict.2" For
example, there is an inherent conflict between general deterrence and
rehabilitation. General deterrence depends on certain punishment. A
sentence imposed solely under the goal of rehabilitation is based on factors such as family background, job training, education, economic stability, and alcohol or drug problems.2' Sentences which are based on such
factors cannot deliver the clear message, needed for general deterrence,
that violations of the rules will be met with certain sanction.
In addition to identifying the goals of the sentencing decision, it is
important to prioritize these goals so, when they do conflict, some clear
policy will favor one over the other. If any sense is to be made out of
sentences, the judge must have clear goals and objectives.25
Different priorities can be placed on these goals by the individual judge
as he makes each sentencing decision. This allows priority to be placed
on different goals in different cases. The problem with allowing ad hoc
18. Bayley, supra note 15, at 544.
19. Id. at 547-48, citing Andenaes, GeneralPreventionRevisited:Research and Policy
Implications, 66 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338, 347 (1975).
20. Bayley, supra note 15, at 549. Isolation is more accurate because inmates often
retain the capacity to commit crimes upon one another and are thus not incapacitated but
are nevertheless isolated from most of society. Dershowitz, supra note 6, at 131.
21. Dershowitz, supra note 6, at 73-74.
22. The goal of rehabilitation has come under considerable attack in recent years and
as a result some states have emphasized other goals in their penal codes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(a)(i) (West Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 5 (Supp. 1984).
23. S. Ringold, A Judge's PersonalPerspective on Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L.
REv. 631 (1976).
24. Bayley, supra note 15, at 536.
25. S. Ringold, supra note 23, at 635.
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determinations is that no overall policy controls each decision. The goal
(or most important goal) of the penal code is determined by one man every
time a sentence is imposed. We believe that a system of guidelines can
be developed which takes into consideration these various goals.
Guidelines would be based upon clearly established priorities and would
eliminate sentences based on the perceived need to emphasize a certain
goal in an individual case. Although this would be a restraint on the ability of the courts to emphasize a different goal in different cases, we believe
this restraint is needed to achieve some equality and rationality in the
state's overall sentencing system. Finally, it should be noted that the
legislature has mandated that in some circumstances one goal of sentencing must take priority. For example, mandatory lengthy sentences for the
habitual criminal means that the legislature has placed priority on
incapacitation.
Although the Wyoming Legislature has indicated that the goal of incapacitation must control in the case of habitual offenders, the legislature
has not provided the judiciary with the guidance needed to determine
which goals the penal code is intended to secure in most cases. The Wyoming Constitution also provides little insight since the Wyoming Supreme
Court has held that a sentence aimed at achieving rehabilitation, punishment, deterrence, or removal (incapacitation) is within the constitutional
parameters of reformation and prevention.26
The legislature and the constitution have given little guidance to the
sentencing judge in Wyoming. Guidance could be given by the Wyoming
Supreme Court through the supreme court's review of sentences. The
following section analyzes supreme court review of sentencing decisions
and looks for the "guidance" that may be gleaned from the supreme
court's opinions.

APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

Under the common law rule, a criminal sentence is not subject to appellate review if it is within the limits set by the legislature. 2 The Wyoming Supreme Court claims that Wyoming does not follow the common
law rule."6 The Wyoming rule allows the state supreme court to modify
a legal sentence if the trial court abused its discretion in imposing it29
This rule was set forth in State v. Sorrentino 0 According to Sorrentino,
the source of the Wyoming Supreme Court's authority to alter a trial
court's sentencing decision is article 5, section 2 of the Wyoming Constitution, which establishes the supreme court's general appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases and its general superintending control over
26. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1983).
27. Id at 1091.
28. Id

29. Id at 1092.
30. 36 Wyo. 111, 118-19, 253 P. 14, 15-16 (1927).
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all inferior courts."1 Justice Blume, writing the opinion in Sorrentino,
reasoned that this constitutional provision clearly granted the Wyoming
Supreme Court the right to review criminal cases, including the sentence. 3
Since Sorrentino,the question of sentencing review has come before the
Wyoming Supreme Court repeatedly.33 Despite the persistence of this
question, a trial court's discretion in sentencing remains unclear.5 '
Before analyzing the concept of "abuse of discretion," the meaning
of "discretion" should be clarified. Discretion is the legal authority to act
officially in certain circumstances according to the dictates of one's own
judgment and conscience, but its exercise is bounded by the rules of law
and must not be arbitrary or capricious. 5 Judicial discretion in sentencing is the power of the trial judge to exercise reasonably his independent
judgment in fixing punishment within limits prescribed by the legislature.
The legal limits within which the judge may exercise his discretion define
the scope of that discretion. Outside of those limits, the court has no
discretion.
Conceptually, abuse of discretion in sentencing is distinguishable from
unlawful judicial action which exceeds the scope of sentencing discretion.
The court cannot "abuse discretion" it does not have. A purported exercise of judicial discretion which exceeds the scope of the trial court's
authority, such as imposing a penalty in excess of the statutory maximum,
is an error of law, as opposed to an abuse of discretion.3 6 Apparently then,
sentencing discretion is abused when its exercise is legal in scope but is
otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable under the circumstances.
In Martinez v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court defined abuse of
discretion by a trial court as an action taken "in a manner which exceeds
the bounds of reason under the circumstances. 3 7 By itself, this part of
the definition suggests that the trial court's exercise of discretion may
be legal in scope but unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious under the circumstances. However, the supreme court blurred this distinction by going on to describe abuse of discretion as "an error of law committed by
the court under the circumstances."' This is confusing. If judicial discretion is bounded by the rules of law, then an error of law is outside the
scope of judicial discretion. Adherence to the law is not discretionary. For
9
example, in Hicklin v. State,"
the trial court required a probation bond
31. WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 2 provides that "[t]he supreme court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall
have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law."
32. Sorrentino v. State, 36 Wyo. 111, 118-19, 253 P. 14, 15 (1927).
33. Wrigh4 670 P.2d at 1092.
34. Id

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

419 (5th ed. 1979).
Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 754 (Wyo. 1975).
611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).
Id
535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 1975).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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of fifty thousand dollars, although the maximum fine for the particular
conviction was only one thousand dollars. The Wyoming Supreme Court
concluded that while the trial court had acted in excess of its punitive
powers (clearly an error of law), in doing so it was not "abusing its discretion" because there is no discretion to impose an illegal sentence.'0
The Wyoming Supreme Court claims that it can review a "legal"
sentence for abuse of discretion. 4 But the supreme court has also equated
abuse of discretion with an error of law committed by the court. This ambiguity apparently prompted Justice Thomas to point out that a sentence
within the statutory limits "cannot be considered an 'error of law committed by the court under the circumstances'. "42 Evidently, if a sentence
is "legal" when it comes within the statutory limits, then the error of law
to which the court refers must not be the sentence itself but rather the
procedure followed by the court in arriving at the particular sentence. In
other words, while a sentence within the statutory limits may be legal,
the trial court may have committed an error of procedural law in making
its sentencing decision. In Wright v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court
associated sentencing procedures with abuse of discretion. 3 Then, in
Robinson v. State the supreme court stated that "we will not find discretion to have been abused when we are able to conclude that, in the sentencing process, the judge has considered the purposes of sentencing...
and has applied them to the facts of the case in a reasonable way."" The
error of law in Hicklin involved the sentence imposed rather than the
sentencing procedure, hence no abuse of discretion was found.
The substantive law with respect to permissible criminal penalties is
clearly spelled out in the statutes. However, except concerning the death
penalty,"' the procedural law or standards of reasonableness to guide the
trial court in exercising its sentencing discretion within the substantive
statutory limits is less clear. 46 Whether abuse of sentencing discretion is
viewed as unreasonableness under the circumstances or an error of law,
resistance to a delineation of guidelines for reasonable sentencing within
statutory limits is apparently based upon concern that such guidelines
will calcify into rigid rules.' 7 It is feared that such rules would reduce the
scope of the sentencing court's discretion to "sentencing by computer"
thereby relegating the sentencing court to a ministerial role.' 8
40. Id at 754.
41. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1092.
42. Id at 1097-98 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
43. Id at 1092.
44. Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374, 377 (Wyo. 1984) (emphasis added).
45. WYo. STAT. §§ 6-2-102 to -103 (June, 1983 replacement); Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d
541, 553-57 (Wyo. 1984). In capital cases the legislature has specified a detailed procedure
which must be followed in imposing the sentence and for reviewing the sentence imposed.
46. Robinson, 678 P.2d at 376; Taylor v. State, 658 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Wyo. 1983) (Rose,
J., specially concurring).
47. Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1138 (Wyo. 1979).
48. 644 P.2d 172, 180 (Wyo. 1982).
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Scope of Sentencing Discretion
The power to prescribe punishment for prohibited acts belongs to the
legislature."9 The legislature is free to retain or delegate sentencing discretion when defining and setting punishment.50 The Wyoming Legislature
has vested in the courts authority to impose sentences within the statutory
limits5 and also to suspend execution of all or part of the sentence
imposed." This wide discretion to impose a prison term, of any length,
within the statutory limits53 may not, however, encompass authority to
sentence a person to the Wyoming State Hospital as part of the penalty
for criminal activity. 4 Moreover, since probation is "constructive
confinement," 55 the trial court's authority to impose a sentence of probation also comes from the legislature. 56 As with a sentence of actual confinement, the trial court may not impose a sentence of probationary
restraints for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized by the statute violated." 7
In most cases there is a broad range of sentences available under the
applicable statutes. Consequently, even within the statutory limits the
scope of sentencing discretion is very broad and its exercise is prone to
disparity. The Wyoming Supreme Court has conceded that criminal sentencing is a highly subjective matter" and that there is more than one
view on the appropriate terms of probation." In addition to the statutes,
Wyoming case law and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure further define the scope of sentencing discretion by recognizing the trial
court's authority to impose disparate sentences upon co-perpetrators of
a crime; s° to determine whether sentences on two or more counts will be
served concurrently or consecutively;' to grant or deny credit for time
49. Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1342 (Wyo. 1983).
50. Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1224 (Wyo. 1982).
51. WYo. STAT. § 6-10-104 (June, 1983 replacement) provides that "[wlithin the limits
prescribed by law, the court shall determine and fix the punishment for any felony or misdemeanor, whether the punishment consists of imprisonment, or fine, or both."
52. WYo. STAT. § 7-13-301 (1977) provides that "[aifter conviction or plea of guilty for
any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend
the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and
may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense
and also place the defendant on probation."
53. Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 380 (Wyo. 1979).
54. Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 646 (Wyo. 1983).
55. Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 742, 753 (Wyo. 1975).
56. Id at 752; Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-301 (1977).
57. Hicklin, 535 P.2d at 753-54.
58. Taylor v. State, 658 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Wyo. 1975).
59. Hicklin, 535 P.2d at 752.
60. Beaulieu v. State, 608 P.2d 275, 276 (Wyo. 1980); Daellenbach v. State, 562 P.2d
679, 683 (Wyo. 1977). Granting mercy to one accomplice in a capital crime does not prevent
sentencing another to death. Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 793 (Wyo. 1983). Neither the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor article 1,section 2 of the Wyoming Constitution, which states that "[fin their inherent right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal," requires exact equality in the
sentencing of co-defendants. Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 180 (Wyo. 1982).
61. Eaton v. State, 660 P.2d 803, 806 (Wyo. 1983).
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served in pre-sentence custody when the pre-sentence custody is not due
to the defendant's indigency (e.g., violation of a bail agreement), and the
sum of the time spent in pre-sentence custody plus the sentence does not
exceed the maximum allowable sentence; 2 to grant or deny reduction of
the defendant's excellent4
a sentence already imposed, notwithstanding
6
record at the Wyoming State Penitentiary; to grant or deny probation,
except for offenses punishable by death or a minimum of life
imprisonment; 66 to revoke probation previously granted;6 6 to impose conditions upon probation or suspension of sentence,6 but not upon post-incarceration parole;66 to consider information that would not be admissi69
ble under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence for the determination of guilt;
to follow or deviate from the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice; 70 to accept or reject the recommendations for sentencits reasons for imposing a
ing in a pre-sentence report;7" to not explain
2
particular sentence or denying probation.7
62. Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 380-81 (Wyo. 1979).
63. Montez v. State, 592 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Wyo. 1979). However, the trial court must
exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence within a period of time provided by Rule 36
of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090,1094 (Wyo.
1983).
64. Minchew v. State, 685 P.2d 30, 33 (Wyo. 1984).
65. WYo. STAT. § 7-13-301 (1977); Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 156-57 (Wyo. 1978).
Probation is not available for a habitual criminal conviction under Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-110 (June,
1983 replacement), which carries a mandatory life sentence. Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333,
1342 (Wyo. 1983).
66. Buck v. State, 603 P.2d 878, 879 (Wyo. 1979).
67. WYo. STAT. § 7-13"303 (Supp. 1984) provides that "(a) [t]he court shall determine
and may, by order duly entered, impose in its discretion, and may at any time modify any
condition of probation or suspension of trial or sentence." WYo. STAT. § 7-13-308 (Supp. 1984)
directs that "[i]f the sentencing court orders suspended imposition of sentence, suspended
sentence or probation, the court shall consider as a condition that the defendant... promptly prepare a plan of restitution." (emphasis added).
68. Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1038 & n.6 (Wyo. 1979).
69. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Wyo. 1983). Even mere allegations of "offenses similar to that charged against the defendant" may properly be considered by the
trial court in exercising its sentencing discretion. Cavanaugh v. State, 505 P.2d 311, 312
(Wyo. 1973). Rule 33(c)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure indicates that information may properly be considered if it is "helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation." Similarly, the trial court is "not categorically barred" from considering hearsay
in determining whether or not probation should be revoked, although the prior finding of
a probation violation "must be based on verified facts." Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055
(Wyo. 1981).
70. Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1137-38 (Wyo. 1979); Hanson v. State, 590 P.2d
832, 835 (Wyo. 1979).
71. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Wyo. 1983). In Wright the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by deciding that the seriousness of the offense of unlawful delivery
of a controlled substance, albeit a small amount, made the defendant "not a fit subject for
probation," despite the facts that he was twenty years old, a first time felony offender, an
honor student at Sheridan College, and the probation agent recommended that he be given
probation. Id at 1091, 1094-95. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
72. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1095; Kenney v. State, 605 P.2d 811, 812 (Wyo. 1980). The
Wyoming Supreme Court will affirm a trial judge "on any legal ground appearing in the
record." Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 382 (Wyo. 1979). While there is no statutory or judicial
requirement for the trial judge to enter into the record his reasons for revoking probation,
Buck v. State, 603 P.2d 878, 880 (Wyo. 1979), Rule 33(f) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the court to apprise the defendant of the grounds on which the revocation of his probation is proposed.
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Abuse of Sentencing Discretion
The Wyoming cases addressing the issue of abuse of discretion in
sentencing generally focus upon whether or not the trial court considered
certain factors in making its sentencing decision. Review based on whether
the appropriate factors were considered is consistent with the concept of
abuse of sentencing discretion as unreasonableness under the circumstances or an error of procedural law. Accordingly, an exercise of
sentencing discretion which is legal in scope might still be arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable if certain pertinent factors were not considered
in the process. The Wyoming Supreme Court has indicated some factors
which the trial court should consider in order to exercise its sentencing
discretion in a reasonable manner."1
The supreme court has stated that in exercising his sentencing discretion, the trial judge should consider all mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. ' Considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances
is necessary to effectuate the policy of individualized sentencing that is
implicit both in Wyoming's statutory system of indeterminate sentenc-6
ing 75 and in the vesting of broad sentencing discretion in the trial judge.1
Factors which can help inform the sentencing judge are the crime itself,
its surrounding circumstances, and the character of the criminal." When
considering the crime, the court may include its seriousness, as reflected
in the severity of punishment allocated by the legislature,7 and its violent
or non-violent nature. 79 The circumstances surrounding the crime may in-

clude the relative reprehensibility of the motive.8 0 The character of the
criminal includes both positive and negative aspects of her background
and should also be considered. 8' The defendant's rehabilitative needs and
potential to be a productive member of society, 82 family background,

education, intelligence, employment history, age, training, criminal and
delinquent record, attitude8
5

3

financial condition,8 4 tendencies toward

violence, and possibly even mere allegations of offenses similar to that
charged against the defendant" are factors that might properly have a
bearing upon the sentence.
73. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1092.
74. Daellenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679, 683 (Wyo. 1977).
75. Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 178-79 (Wyo. 1982). Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-201 (1977)
provides that "[w]hen a convict is sentenced to the state penitentiary, otherwise than for
life, for an offense or crime, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite term
of imprisonment, but shall establish a maximum and minimum term for which said convict
shall be held in said prison."
76. Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 178 (Wyo. 1982).
77. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1092.
78. Id
79. Id at 1092-93.
80. Id at 1093.
81. Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 180 (Wyo. 1982).
82. Id
83. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1093.
84. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 33(c)(2).
85. Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 751 (Wyo. 1975).
86. Cavanaugh v. State, 505 P.2d 311, 312 (Wyo. 1973).
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In order to promote consideration of these factors, rule 33(a) of the
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure directs that, before imposing
sentence, the court shall address the defendant personally and ask him
if he wishes to present any information in mitigation of the punishment.87
In addition, rule 33(c)(2) provides that, unless waived, a pre-sentence report
shall contain such information as may be helpful in imposing sentence
or granting probation." Although, as previously noted, acceptance of the
recommendation in a pre-sentence report is discretionary, 9 the court may
be abusing its discretion if it fails to consider information contained in
the report.9
While the supreme court has indicated that the trial court should consider all of the above factors, the supreme court has not been true to its
holdings. For example, in Smith v.State,9' the trial judge imposed a
sentence of twenty to forty years for a second degree murder. The defendant appealed the sentence. The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that while
forty years is a long time, the defendant could have received a life sentence
and that in Jaramillov.State,92 a life sentence for the same offense was
upheld.9 3 The supreme court failed to note that in Smith's case a forty
year sentence may have been an abuse of discretion while a life sentence
for Jaramillo may have been justified. The court's sole reliance on the
length of the two sentences coupled with its failure to note aggravating
and mitigating circumstances seems to be at odds with its pronouncement
in Daellenbachv. State,94 that aggravating and mitigating factors should
be considered by the sentencing judge.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has also stated that the trial court
should consider the philosophy and purposes of sentencing in making its
sentencing decision. The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized four
purposes as being in accord with article 1, section 15 of the Wyoming Constitution, which directs that the "penal code shall be framed on the humane
principles of reformation and prevention." The four purposes are: "(1)
rehabilitation, (2) punishment (specific deterrence and retribution), (3)example to others (general deterrence), and (4) removal from society (incapacitation or protection of the public)." 96
Although the supreme court has held that any of these four goals is
within the constitutional parameters, it has not stated that any one goal
is more important than any of the others. Nor has the court stated that
87. Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 750 (Wyo. 1975).
88. Daellenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679, 683 (Wyo. 1977); Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639,
645 (Wyo. 1983).
89. Wrigh 670 P.2d at 1095. See supra note 71.
90. Wright 670 P.2d at 1095.
91. 564 P.2d 1194 (Wyo. 1977).
92. 517 P.2d 490 (Wyo. 1974).
93. Both Smith and Jaramillo were convicted under Wyo. STAT. § 6-55 (1957) which
provided for a range of twenty years to life for the offense of second degree murder.
94. 562 P.2d 679, 683 (Wyo. 1977).
95. Id; Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374, 377 (Wyo. 1984).
96. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1093.
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all of the goals should be sought in one sentencing decision. Without any
explicit prioritization, the sentencing court is free to emphasize any goal
in any individual's case. This allows different judges to impose different
sentences in identical cases only because each judge felt that a different
goal needed to be emphasized. This creates problems of disparity and difficulty in achieving the goals of the penal code. These problems are discussed at greater length below.
Probationand Abuse of Discretion
The supreme court has also mandated that certain procedures must
be followed when an offender has applied for probation in a case in which
probation is permissible."' If he does, the trial court must at least consider the application. 8 Failure to consider a defendant's application for
probation is an abuse of discretion" because, although the trial judge is
not required to spell out her reasons for denying probation, 10 the denial
"must not be based upon mere whim or caprice nor upon any ground not
sanctioned by the law."' 0'
To further the policy of individualizing criminal justice, 02 the Wyoming Supreme Court has identified some factors of particular concern in
granting or denying probation. The trial court should consider the defendant's rehabilitative needs,103 the seriousness assigned to the offense by
the legislature,1 0 4 and the possibility that releasing the defendant on probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense' 0 or endanger the public.' 6 For example, in Taylor v.State, the sentencing court
properly considered whether these ends would be served by granting probation to a defendant convicted of an offense (DWUI) related to his uncured drinking problem when the defendant had failed to seek proper
treatment. 0 7
Although the seriousness of an offense may be considered in deciding
whether to grant or deny probation, 0 8 generalizations about types of offenses alone are not a proper basis for deciding not to consider probation
in the first place. 0 9 Similarly, general public sentiment against the type
of crime (e.g., rape) for which a particular defendant was convicted, should
97. WYo. STAT. § 7-13-301 (1977) authorizes the trial court to grant probation except
for "crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment." In Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144,
156-57 (Wyo. 1978), the supreme court read the statute to mean that probation was unavailable
only for crimes punishable by death or a minimum of life imprisonment. See supra note 65
and accompanying text.
98. Wright 670 P.2d at 1094.
99. Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1137-38 (Wyo. 1979).
100. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1095.
101. Sanchez, 592 P.2d at 1137.
102. Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 157 JWyo. 1978).
103. Taylor v. State, 658 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Wyo. 1983).
104. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1094-95; Eaton v. State, 660 P.2d 803, 806 (Wyo. 1983).
105. Taylor, 658 P.2d at 1300.
106. Id.; Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 382 (Wyo. 1979).
107. Taylor, 658 P.2d at 1300.
108. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1095.
109. Sanchez, 592 P.2d at 1138.
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not play a role in the trial court's decision whether or not to considerprobation in a particular case."'
The Wyoming Supreme Court has indicated that the prior criminal
record of a defendant may be a factor properly considered by the trial court
in deciding whether to grant or deny probation. 11 However, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has also indicated that the American Bar Association Standards of Probation, though not binding, should be taken into account in
determining a grant or denial of probation, ' 12 and according to section
1.3(a) of those standards the probation decision should not turn upon the
existence of a prior criminal record.The revocation of probation calls for a two-stage process. Initially the
court must determine whether or not a condition of probation was in fact
violated. If there was a violation, the court must then decide whether or
not to revoke probation."" In making the revocation decision, the court
should consider the reasons for imposing the probation conditions that
were violated, the nature of the violation, the reasons for the violation,"'
and, possibly, alternatives to revoking probation." '
Finally, although Wyoming does not have explicit standards to guide
the trial judge in the exercise of his sentencing discretion," 7 other sources
of guidance, such as the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice (Sentencing Alternatives, Probation), are available."' While it is
within the discretion of the trial judge whether or not to follow the A.B.A.
Standards in making his sentencing decision, failure at least to consider
them may be an abuse of discretion."19
EstablishingAbuse of Sentencing Discretion
The trial court's failure to consider pertinent factors in making its
sentencing decision may amount to an abuse of discretion, but this has
not been very fertile ground for overturning sentences on appeal. The
Wyoming Supreme Court has emphasized its great reluctance to disturb
a sentencing decision unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.'2 0 The
defendant has the burden of establishing an abuse of sentencing discretion.' The supreme court has defined abuse of discretion as both unrea110. Id
111. Beaulieu v. State, 608 P.2d 275 (Wyo. 1980); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 33(c)(2).
112. Sanchez, 592 P.2d at 1138.
113. Id
114. Buck v. State, 603 P.2d 878, 880 (Wyo. 1979).
115. Id at 879.
116. Id at 880.
117. Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374, 376 (Wyo. 1984); Taylor, 658 P.2d at 1301 (Rose,
J., specially concurring).
118. Sanchez, 592 P.2d at 1137.
119. Id.; Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 179 (Wyo. 1982).
120. Taylor, 658 P.2d at 1298-99.
121. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1005 (Wyo. 1984). Even if the defendant establishes
that the trial court failed to consider pertinent factors in making its decision, the remedy
will most likely be a remand to the same court for re-sentencing based upon appropriate
considerations. Sanchez, 592 P.2d at 1138; Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 383 (Wyo. 1979).
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sonableness under the circumstances and an error of law.'22 In addition
the court has declared that it will not notice an alleged abuse of discretion unless the defendant cites some precedent or authority to support
his allegation. 23
In Jahnke v. State, Jahnke argued that, in the absence of standards
under which the fairness of a sentence can be measured, there is no
possibility of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. 2 4 The sentence in question was within the statutory limits, and, as noted earlier, if there was
any abuse of discretion it could only have been an error in the sentencing
procedure. The Wyoming Supreme Court observed that the trial judge
had considered all circumstances surrounding the crime, the character of
the appellant, and the relevant sentencing purposes. The court concluded that there had been no abuse of discretion.' 5 The supreme court added that the same result would have been reached had26 the case been reviewed under the standards urged by the appellant.
While the Wyoming Supreme Court may be presently in the throes
of attempting to determine sentencing standards, 127 it has regularly
managed to find that the trial court sufficiently considered the pertinent
factors to affirm their sentencing decisions. The supreme court finds sufficient consideration even though the sentencing judge is not required to
enter into the record his reasons for the sentence imposed or the denial
of probation. 2 8 This is not surprising since no particular amount of consideration is required, but only that the pertinent factors be considered
"however slightly."''
The case law is illustrative. The mere ordering of a pre-sentence report
by the trial judge may be enough to satisfy the supreme court on review
that mitigating and aggravating circumstances were considered in the
sentencing process."i 0 A direct statement by the trial judge to reflect that
he considered probation is not necessary, 3' nor does the word "probation"
even need be mentioned. 2 The supreme court has found evidence that
probation was adequately considered merely from the fact that probation
was requested and that the pre-sentence report contained a probation
plan.3' This amounts to an assumption that if probation should have been
If an initial sentence was reversed, the same court may re-sentence the defendant to the same
amount of jail time he had received under the first sentence. The defendant also has the burden
of presenting persuasive reasons to support any claim that the new sentence was retaliatory
or vindictive. Taylor, 658 P.2d at 1299.
122. Wright 670 P.2d at 1092.
123. Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203, 209 (Wyo. 1972); Taylor, 658 P.2d at 1299.
124. 682 P.2d 991, 1008-09 (Wyo. 1984). See also Eaton v. State, 660 P.2d 803, 805-06
(Wyo. 1983).
125. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1009 (Wyo. 1984).
126. Id
127. Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374, 376 (Wyo. 1984).
128. Kenney v. State, 605 P.2d 811, 812 (Wyo. 1980).
129. Beaulieu v. State, 608 P.2d 275 (Wyo. 1980).
130. Daellenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679, 683 (Wyo. 1977).
131. Kenney, 605 P.2d at 812.
132. Beaulieu, 608 P.2d 275 (Wyo. 1980).
133. Id
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considered, then it must have been considered. The supreme court has
even affirmed the denial of probation when the record reflected the passage
3
of sufficient time in which the judge could have considered his options." '
Yet the supreme court has stated that the "mere parroting" of acceptable
reasons for a sentencing decision is not a substitute for actually consider3 5
ing the pertinent factors."
In Sanchez v. State the supreme court did find an abuse of sentencing discretion. The court's holding was based not so much upon the trial
court's improper denial of probation as upon the trial court's failure even
to consider probation.'" In Sanchez, the sentencing judge commented on
his reasons for not considering probation, and from his comments the
supreme court found an abuse of sentencing discretion.'37 The comments
strongly suggested that the decision not to considerprobation turned upon
generalizations about types of offenses, rather than upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.' Ironically, the supreme court would
not have found an abuse of discretion if the judge had simply failed to
give any reasons for his probation decision. 3 9 This situation encourages
judges not to state the reasons for their decisions. This may reduce the
number of sentences which are overturned but it also "hides" the sentence
that was imposed for inappropriate reasons.
NEED FOR CHANGE

The above section makes it clear that appellate review for abuse of
discretion in sentencing in Wyoming is based on such a nebulous concept
as to make it practically non-existent. Both Justice Thomas and Justice
Rose have concluded that some changes in the current review process are
needed, however, they diverge sharply on what those changes are.
Justice Thomas has urged the court to adopt the common law rule
40
and refuse to review a sentence that is within the statutory limits."
Justice Rose, on the other hand, believes that the court should continue
to review criminal sentences. He has stated, however, that the current
law in Wyoming is that only illegal sentences are reviewable."' Justice
Rose has consistently urged that the court adopt sentencing guidelines
in order to facilitate rational sentencing practices and provide a firm basis
for appellate review."2
134. Wright 670 P.2d at 1095.

135. Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 382 (Wyo. 1983).

136. 592 P.2d 1130, 1138 (Wyo. 1979). In fact, since the sentencing judge thought he
could not consider probation, he really did not exercise any discretion. Id. at 1137.

137. Id. at 1137-38.
138. Id. at 1138.

139. Wright, 670 P.2d at 1095.
140. Id. at 1097 (Thomas, J., specially concurring). Justice Thomas states that the Wyoming Supreme Court has as a matter of practice, adopted this rule of non-review for legal

sentences.

141. Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 188 (Wyo. 1982) (Rose, C.J., specially concurring).
142. See, e.g., Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1115-17 (Wyo. 1981).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss2/10

14

Barrash and Gruver: Reforming Criminal Sentencing in Wyoming
1985

COMMENTS

Justice Thomas believes that there should be no review of the legal
sentence because the trial judge can best evaluate the defendant's
characteristics.' The importance to Justice Thomas of having the defendant before the sentencer is exemplified by his statements in Wright v.
State.'" In Wright he stated that such review amounts to adjusting
sentences based upon a cold record and that it is not possible to experience
another individual through a file of papers.' 14 Justice Thomas' concern,
and a frequently stated policy argument opposing appellate review of
sentencing, is that the sentencing judge is in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence.' 6 This argument has been criticized for
a number of reasons.
Many commentators have suggested that an appellate court can "experience" a defendant if two devices are employed. First, a pre-sentence
investigation, designed to provide a "case history of the offender's past7
arrests, personal difficulties, employment record, and family relations,"'
must be in the record for review. Second, the sentencing judge must provide a reasoned opinion for the sentence.'4 8 With this information the appellate court will have most of the information used by the sentencing
judge. If the judge imposed the sentence for reasons not appearing in the
pre-sentence investigation report, then his reasons should appear in the
sentencing opinion.
Even with these devices the trial judge could still be allowed discretion. Appellate courts are quite used to according latitude "to the man
on the scene," but where his judgment is wrong, (clearly excessive, without
a rational basis, dictated by emotion or suffers from some similar defect),
they will intervene.' 9 The trial judge has the offender before him when
he imposes the sentence, but it really does not seem necessary to know
what the offender "looked like" in order to determine if a sentence is excessive. If the sentence is based on lack of remorse, etc., the judge should
be required to articulate such reasons for the sentence.
Justice Thomas acknowledges that there should be review of illegal
sentences. Clearly, when the legislature has authorized a range of sentences for an offense, it did not intend for judges to impose sentences
beyond that range. Just as surely, when a legislature authorizes a range
of years for an offense, it does not mean that it makes no difference what
143.
144.
145.
146.
YALE L.
147.

Wright 670 P.2d at 1098 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
Wright, 670 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1983).
Id.at 1098 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
Appellate Review of PrimarySentencing Decisions:A ConnecticutCase Study, 69
J. 1453, 1454 & n.9 (1960).
Coburn, Disparity in Sentences andAppellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS

L. REV. 207, 216 (1971).

148. Along with providing a basis for appellate review, articulating the reasons for a
sentence should improve each sentence and contribute to the development of a rational sen-

tencing policy for the future.
SENTENCES

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE - APPELLATE REVIEW OF

§ 2.3 commentary at 23 (1978).

149. Id at 29.
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sentence within that range is selected.'50 The legislature provided for a
broad range of sentences in order to allow the courts to impose different
sentences for the same crime. The rationale for such broad ranges must
be that offenders who have committed the same crime should be treated
differently depending on the facts of each case. Reviewing only an illegal
sentence indicates that any range may be selected for any reason.' I This
could not be what the legislature intended. If the legislative intent in
authorizing ranges for sentences is to be upheld, then there must be review
of "legal" sentences in order to determine whether the facts of the case
justify the range selected.
There cannot be review of "legal" sentences unless there is guidance
given as to the appropriate factors for sentencing decisions. The Wyoming Supreme Court has sent confusing signals to a sentencing judge concerning appropriate factors and goals. The legislature has given even less
guidance. As stated above, Wyoming's penal code authorizes some very
broad penalty ranges. When the legislature establishes a sentence of five
to fifty years, it has told the judge that the offender convicted under the
worst circumstances should be sentenced to no more than fifty years. The
offender at the other extreme should receive no less than five years. The
legislature has focused on the offenders at each extreme, and, in the process, has given the judiciary little guidance for determining what sentence
5
should be imposed upon the offenders who do not fall at these extremes. '
What effect does this lack of guidance have? First, it produces fertile
ground for disparate sentences. Second, it creates a situation in which
every judge becomes an independent policy-maker.
Disparity is a potential problem whenever individuals impose sentences. Perhaps the least controllable factor which determines the sentence
' 3
in any given case is the background and personality of the trial judge.
That the background of judges is critical to the issue of disparity was
shown in a survey of federal judges.'5 In the study, each one of fifty federal
judges was given the files of twenty offenders and each judge was asked
to determine the appropriate sentence for each offender. One offender, who
150. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 1.2 commentary at
25 (1968).
151. The Wyoming Supreme Court has, at times, seemed to embrace the philosophy that
it does not make any difference what range is selected for someone convicted of a serious
crime. In Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1981), the court stated that the
seriousness of the crime can outweigh all other things favorable to the offender. Such a standard clearly violates the legislature's intent in devising a range of sentences for that offense.
If the maximum sentence can be imposed, regardless of a number of mitigating factors, solely
because the judge feels the crime is serious, then the provision for sentences below the maximum is eliminated from the statute.
152. See Dershowitz, supra note 6, at 12.
153. Coburn, supra note 147, at 210.
154. See Sen. Kennedy, Toward a New System of CriminalSentencing-Law with Order,
16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 358 (1979), citing A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY,

A

REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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had been convicted of extortion, was "sentenced" to twenty years and
a $65,000 fine by one judge and to three years and no fine by another. 55
In his recent article, 156 David Roberts pointed out that disparity in
Wyoming does exist among the various judicial districts. Roberts compared the average sentences imposed in the different judicial districts in
Wyoming. Although the disparity that did exist was less than might have
been expected, it was significant nevertheless. 11 7 In addition, Roberts'
analysis does not present the entire picture. The emphasis in Roberts'
survey was placed on disparity between judicial districts on average sentences.5 6 Such analysis de-emphasizes other problems with the current
sentencing structure. First, it does not point out the unexplained disparity between two individual sentences that may be given by different judges
or even by the same judge at different times. Second, such a survey does
not indicate what policies of sentencing, if any, were the basis for each
individual sentence. Therefore, the survey does not indicate whether the
sentences were imposed pursuant to an overall policy or whether such
policy even exists.
Although disparity is a problem in Wyoming, it is only a symptom
of a larger problem. The lack of a clear sentencing policy or the failure
to explicitly state a policy is the underlying problem in Wyoming. Without
explicit goals for the sentencing judge, each judge becomes an independent policy-maker, possibly seeking different and even conflicting goals
from other judges. The judge may even impose sentences pursuant to a
goal which conflicts with the goal he sought when he imposed his last
sentence. The judge may impose a sentence without any clear policy in
mind. The penal code cannot achieve its goals through such unbridled
sentencing practices.
Disparity in sentencing exists in Wyoming. The current status of appellate review of sentences clearly provides little, if any, hope to change
legal yet excessive sentences. The goals of sentencing in Wyoming are
unclear and have not been clarified by case law. All of these problems can
be alleviated to some extent if sentencing guidelines are adopted by the
judiciary. These guidelines should be developed by the judiciary and implemented within the current framework of Wyoming's penal code.
By adopting sentencing guidelines the legislature's intent in promulgating the current penal code would not be trammeled. At the same
time, sentences would be imposed based upon more than one judge's view
of the "proper" sentence. Developing this rational sentencing structure
is dependent upon structuring and limiting, but not eliminating,
discretion."19
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Sen. Kennedy, supra note 154, at 358-60.
Roberts, supra note 3.
It at 631-35.
Id. at 626-33.

L.

J.

D.

& A.

WILKINS,
KRESS,
GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN
GELMAN, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. WILKINS].
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SENTENCING GUIDELINES

There are two approaches for developing guidelines: descriptive and
prescriptive. While they are different, both usually result in the development of a grid which contains four major features: an offender score, an
offense score, presumptive sentence cells, and a dispositional line. The Minnesota sentencing grid below is typical of guidelines containing these
features. A brief general description using the Minnesota grid is helpful
in understanding the more detailed discussion below.
The offender score (criminal history score) is placed on one axis and
the offense score (severity level) on the other. Each one of these scores
is derived by totaling points assigned to significant factors. The sentencing judge then charts each of the scores. The point of intersection within
the matrix contains the presumed sentence. The presumed sentence can
be either a single figure or a narrow range within which the judge may
sentence. The dispositional line is a fixed dividing line running throughout
the grid which determines the "iniout" decision. The cells below the line
contain a presumptive sentence, but the offender is not actually incarcerated. Instead he is placed in some kind of constructive confinement
such as probation. The cells above the line contain a presumptive sentence
for the period of incarceration.
Although most guidelines have this grid consisting of these four
features, there are substantial variations in guidelines. The most important distinction between the guidelines themselves is the method used
to determine the offender and offense scores. The scores are derived by
adding points given various factors. Determining what factors to include
and the point values to assign to those factors is what differentiates the
prescriptive and descriptive guidelines.
Descriptive Guidelines
Descriptive guidelines mirror past sentencing practices. A descriptive
sentencing guideline is based on the assumption that, while judges are
making sentencing decisions on a case-by-case basis, they are
simultaneously, as a by-product, making decisions on a policy level.16 D The
object of descriptive guidelines is to uncover this latent policy and mirror past sentencing practices by determining which factors have been important in making sentencing decisions. Judicial discretion is then structured by making this previously latent policy explicit. An example of the
process of developing descriptive guidelines is provided by a feasibility
study conducted in two jurisdictions from July, 1974 to June, 1976.161
The initial step was to identify the items of information which judges
had previously used in imposing sentences. The items used in prior cases
160. Id at 10.
161. Although four court sites were selected to take part in the study only two, Denver
County, Colorado and Vermont, were active 15articipants from which data was collected. Id
at xiii.
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IV. SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID
PresumDtive Sentence Lengths in Months
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which ajudge may sentence without the
sentence being deemed a departure.
Offenders with nonimprisonment felony sentences are subject to jail time according to law.
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
SEVERITY LEVEI-S OF
CONVICTION OFFENSE
Unauthorized U. w
Motor Vehicle
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7
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I
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Ajegr,r a

Rdbblk-r

Criminal Sexual Conduct
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(with intent)
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X
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140
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1st Degree Murder is excluded from the guidelines by law and continues to have a mandatory life sentence.
At the disretion of thejudge, up to a year in jail and/or other non-jail sanctions can be imposed as condiLj

tions of probation.
Presumptive commitment to state imprisonment.

*one year and one day
(Rev. Eff. 811/81; 1111/83; 811/84)
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were then sought for each sentencing decision imposed for the cases sampled. Although 205 items of information were
sought, a large number were
62
often unavailable for a particular case.
The second step was to determine the effect that each of these items
had on the sentencing decisions. 16 3 Those items which were determined
to have a significant impact"' on the decision were then used in developing a predictive model. In one area of the study only six items were
statistically significant. These six items included: (1) number of offenses
for which the offender was convicted; J2) number of prior incarcerations;
(3) seriousness of the offense at the time of the conviction in terms of the
maximum sentence which could be imposed; (4) use of a weapon in committing the offense; (5) legal status of the offender at the time of the offense (e.g., was the offender on probation?); (6) length of the offender's
employment prior to the offense.' 6'
These factors were then used to create a predictive model. The model
was tested by comparing sentences imposed in new cases with the sentence
that the model would have arrived at by using the factors that had been
weighted based on sentences imposed in previous cases. Through this
testing the weight given to each factor was adjusted so that the model
became more accurate.
After the model reached its maximum accuracy, it was implemented
as the guideline for future sentencing decisions. The judges began imposing sentences guided by factors that were determined to have been most
significant in previous sentencing decisions.
Descriptive guidelines are merely an explanation of what the
"average" judge would have sentenced a particular offender to in the past.
No new policy is developed by the guidelines. They only reflect the past
policy. 6 Because of this, and because of the method used to develop
descriptive guidelines, such guidelines have been subjected to strong
criticism.
First, the empirical formulation used to develop descriptive guidelines
is claimed to provide "only weak predictions and even weaker explanations of judicial sentencing behavior." 6 7 Specifically two of the flaws in
162. A list of the 205 items is produced at pages 41-44 of the study. In the Denver Pilot
Study, 48 items of information were missing in over 25 percent of the cases. In the Vermont
sample, 32 items were missing from at least 25 percent of the cases. Id at 11.
163. Multiple regression was the technique employed to determine the effect each factor had on sentencing decisions. Multiple regression is used by determining the independent variable (information item) which, by itself, accounts for the greatest amount of variation in the dependent variable (sentencing decision) and then using the same process for each
of the remaining independent variables.
164. Statistically significant was defined as accounting for more than .01 of the variation. L.WILKINS, supra note 159, at 12-13.
165. Id
166. J. MILLER, M. ROBERTS & C. CARTER, SENTENCING REFORM: A REVIEW AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 42 (1981). [hereinafter cited as J.MILLER]
167. W. RICH, L. SUTTON, T. CLEAR, & M. SAKS, SENTENCING BY MATHEMATICS: AN
EVALUATION OF THE EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES

xxiv (1982) [hereinafter cited as W. RICH].
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the empirical formulation appear to be that researchers unavoidably must
make "research decisions that have significant policy implications." This
turns researchers into policy-makers.""s Another flaw of the empirical forproduce an adequate explanatory account of
mulation is that it cannot
16 9
the sentencing process.
Second, the empirical formulation has been attacked for reasons other
than the "statistical" problems involved. Descriptive guidelines (those
produced by an empirical formulation) regulate but do not alter sentencing practices, and in doing so they have been criticized for making
legitimate undesirable and unfair sentencing practices. 7 '
Prescriptive Guidelines
Prescriptive guidelines do not simply attempt to mirror past sentencing practices. Instead of using some empirical analysis of past sentences
to determine guidelines for the future, a prescriptive approach determines
what factors should be considered in imposing sentences. The factors that
should be considered can be determined by a sentencing commission, by
the legislature, by trial judges, or by the supreme court. 7 '
Prescriptive guidelines are superior to descriptive guidelines for a
number of reasons. Descriptive guidelines are intended to represent past
latent sentencing policies. It is questionable whether they even accurately represent past sentencing. Even if they do, they only represent what
the average judge did. They do not determine why the judges acted as
they did; therefore, there is no way to determine what policies, if any, were
guiding each judge.
Prescriptive guidelines force appropriate policy-makers to determine
at which goals the sentencing system should be aimed. They do not merely
reflect and then institutionalize past practices which may be questionable.
The prescriptive approach may infringe on the sentencing judge's discretion, but it does so because there are now explicit policy goals being
sought; policy goals which have been determined by some elected or
judicial body and not by researchers.
VARIATIONS IN GuIDELINES

Whether a prescriptive or descriptive approach is taken in developing guidelines, variations still exist. These variations consist of differences
within the guidelines themselves, and the manner in which they are implemented and enforced.
Single or Multiple Grid
The first major variation is whether one sentencing grid is used for
all crimes or whether a separate grid is developed for different "classes"
168. Id. at 86.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. Flaxman, The Hidden Dangers of Sentencing Guildelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259,
270-71 (1979).
171. J. MILLER, supra note 166, at 41.
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of crime. In the Denver study, five felony classes and three misdemeanor
classes were developed from the Colorado penal code.' Within each of
the classes different crimes were assigned a value which would be a part
of the offense score. The value assigned would increase with an increase
in the perceived seriousness of the crime. This offense score was then
charted on a grid which contained only crimes of the same "class."
On the other hand, it is possible to develop one single grid to be applied to all classes of crimes. If one "master" grid is developed, then it
is used in all sentencing decisions regardless of the offense. Again, an offense seriousness score is used, and part of the score is the point value
assigned to each class of offense. Because all crimes are included on a single
grid, each point value classification is very broad in that it includes a
number of offenses all deemed to be of equal seriousness. A single grid
model is defective if different offenses are included within the same
classification when they are not truly equally serious. ' Classifications
may become over encompassing if the creators of the grid place too much
emphasis on keeping the grid simple by limiting the range of scores on
the offense axis.
Offense Score
A second variation between guidelines is the exact method used to
determine offender and offense scores. The offense score is usually the
sum of the points assigned to various factors relating to the seriousness
of the offense.y 4 The major portion of the total offense score is the value
assigned to the offense itself. Other factors, which are deemed to make
the offense more serious, are assigned values. These factors are then added to the value assigned to the offense, and the sum is the total offense
score. The values assigned and the factors considered differ among various
guidelines.
In Maryland's guidelines, a value is assigned to different offenses
75
based upon the "seriousness" category that encompasses the offense.
Three other factors are also assigned point values: victim injury, weapon
use, and special vulnerability of the victim. The score given for each of
these three factors plus the value assigned for the seriousness class is the
offense score.', The factors used in Maryland's guidelines differ from those
used in the Denver study.
172. L.

WILKINS, supra note 159, at 53.
173. Such a scheme would violate what Von Hirsch has labelled ordinal proportionality.
See Von Hirsch, Commensurabilty and Crime Prevention:Evaluating FormalSentencing
Structures and Their Rationale, 74 J. Calm. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 209, 213 (1983).
174. The seriousness of criminal conduct has two major components: harm and culpabilty.
Id at 214.
175. In Maryland's guidelines, all offenses were categorized into only seven classes. Since
classes five, six, and seven were assigned the same point value for determining an offense
score, it could be argued that in fact only five classes were created. See Levin, Maryland's
Sentencing Guidelines - A System By and ForJudges, 68 JUDICATURE 172, 177 (Oct.-Nov.
1984).
176. Id at 176. The point ranges for each factor were: 1-10 for category seriousness;
0-2 for victim injury: 0-2 for weapon usage; and 0-1 for victim vulnerability.
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The Denver study used assigned values for three or four seriousness
groups for an offense score (depending for which of the multiple grids they
were used). The only other factor was a harm/loss modifier which was
developed to more accurately reflect the real seriousness of the offense.'
Since offenders often are convicted of offenses while not demonstrating
the type of behavior normally associated with that offense, this modifier
was used to help reflect the offender's actions in greater detail than the
seriousness category alone could. 7 The value assigned to the seriousness
category plus the score for the harmlloss modifier was the offense score.
The rationale behind the offense score is that it should increase as
the seriousness of the activity increases. The offense seriousness rating
is usually derived from the sentencing practice currently used in the
jurisdiction.7 9 When a large number of offenses are included within the
same offense category, they may cover conduct that varies in its degree
of seriousness.9 0 Therefore additional factors, such as those in the
Maryland guidelines, are used to insure that the total offense score more
accurately reflects the seriousness of the offender's actions.
Offender Score
The offender score is found on the other axis of the matrix. The factors used to calculate the *totaloffender score also vary among different
guidelines. The offender scores in the different guidelines do have a common ground: they consist primarily of the offender's prior criminal history.
The Maryland and Denver study guidelines provide an example of the
differences in offender scores. In Maryland, the offender score consisted
of points for: the current relationship to the criminal justice system;
juvenile delinquency history; prior adult criminal record; and prior
parole/probation violations."' The Denver study's offender score included five factors: prior incarcerations," 2 probation or parole revocations, legal
status of the offender at the time of the offense, prior convictions, and
employment history.' 83
The major difference in the offender scores of the two guidelines is
the emphasis placed on employment history. By including this factor, the
177. L. WILKINS, supra note 159, at 65.
178. The harm/loss modifier ranged in value from 0-5 (victimless crime to death), while
the remainder of the offense score ranged in value from 1-7. Id
179. Ozanne, Bringinga Rule of Law to CriminalSentencing:JudicialReview, Sentencing Guidelines and a Policy of JustDeserts 13 LOYOLA U. L. J. 721,736 (1982). See Von Hirsch,

supra note 173, at 216 for a criticism of basing guidelines on existing ranges for offenses.
180. Von Hirsch, supra note 173, at 227.
181. Levin, supra note 175, at 178. Note that all of the Maryland offender factors relate
to past criminal history.
182. Prior incarcerations were used instead of prior arrests for "moral" considerations
and because the substitution of one for the other did not affect the model's accuracy. L.
WILKINS, supra note 159, at 65.
183. Id at 24. By including employment history, the Demonstration Model reflected
an indication of social stability that was not included in Maryland's guidelines.
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guidelines are intended to reflect the offender's social stability.' 84 A "socially stable" offender need not be specifically deterred or rehabilitated to
the same extent as the socially unstable offender.
Regardless of the exact factors ultimately included in the offense and
offender scores and regardless of the number of grids used, the guidelines
are expected to achieve at least two goals. They are intended to reduce
the differences between judges and to reduce the individual judge's
inconsistency' 5 by developing a consistent policy basis for sentencing.
The prescriptive guidelines are also intended to change past practice if
judges had considered improper factors or goals. How well guidelines
achieve these goals depends to a large extent on the manner in which they
are implemented.
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES

Both Maryland's guidelines and the Denver descriptive guidelines
were implemented through voluntary acceptance by the judiciary. Not
only were the guidelines implemented through voluntary methods, but
even if they were accepted, the sentencing judge was free to depart from
the guidelines in any case.' 86 The judges were requested to explain any
deviations from the presumptive sentence.' 87
Researchers have questioned the usefulness of guidelines in light of
voluntary implementation, and the lack of any monitoring functions. A
study of the impact of the Denver study guidelines on disparity reached
the conclusion that voluntary guidelines have no impact. They failed to
reduce sentence disparity.'88 An analysis of Maryland's voluntary
guidelines also showed that the guidelines, as implemented, led to only
a modest decrease in sentencing disparity. 8 9
Although both studies indicated that the guidelines achieved few if
any of the benefits they were designed to achieve, neither recommended
dismissing guidelines as a potential avenue for sentencing reform. Both,
in fact, indicated that guidelines still represented an avenue worth
pursuing.' 0
Whether the descriptive guideline itself has shortcomings may be subject to debate. What is clear, however, is that guidelines of any kind cannot be implemented in a "loose" fashion. The shortcomings of the
Maryland guidelines appeared to lie with their voluntary implementation.'8" Only seventy per cent of the eligible scoresheets were filed in the
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id
W. RicH, supra note 167, at xxvi.
L. WILKINS, supra note 159, at 29.
Id; Levin, supra note 175, at 178.

188. W. RICH, supra note 167, at xxvii.

189. Carrow, Judicial Sentencing Guidelines: Hazards of the Middle Ground, 68
161, 163. (Oct.-Nov. 1984).
190. Id at 171; W. RicH, supra note 167, at 207.
191. Carrow, supra note 189, at 171.

JUDICATURE
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Maryland sample cases. 192 The failure of many judges to "procedurally"
comply with the guidelines is also illustrated by another study of voluntary guidelines. In the guidelines studied, there was a request that any
deviation from the sentence recommended by the guidelines be accompanied by a reason for the deviation. In one jurisdiction in the study only
twelve per9 3cent of the deviations were accompanied by a written
statement.
ENFORCEMENT

If guidelines are to be effective, they must be mandatory and they
must be enforced. The Maryland guidelines and others implemented
through voluntary compliance obviously cannot be enforced through formal methods. Mandatory guidelines can, however, be enforced through
appellate review of sentences.
Minnesota's and Pennsylvania's systems provide examples of enforcement through appellate review. Both allow the prosecution and the defense
to appeal the appropriateness of sentences."" The Pennsylvania guidelines
were aimed at increasing the number of serious offenders sent to prison
and at making punishments more uniform. The guidelines have increased
the number of serious offenders put in jail and have made sentences more
uniform.'9 5 The Minnesota guidelines also accomplished their goal of reserving prison space for serious offenders, although this success has eroded
somewhat since the first year of the guidelines' existence. 96 The success
of the guidelines in these states, and the limited success of those in states
without appellate review, suggests that an enforcement mechanism such
as appellate review is a necessary component of successful guidelines.'97
Appellate review can be facilitated by including a requirement that
the sentencing judge give a written explanation for any deviation from
the presumptive sentence. 98 If the appellate court determines that the
explanation shows that the sentencing judge was justified in refusing to
apply the guidelines, then the sentence should be upheld. The reviewing
court should not normally accept a deviation based upon a factor which
was already considered in creating the guidelines. If it did, it would be
allowing each sentencing judge to rearrange the structure of priorities
created by the guidelines.
This required explanation can also help the guidelines' evolution. If,
for example, judges consistently impose a sentence below the guidelines'
recommendations for a specific offense, then the guidelines may be un192. Id at 170. In the Florida cases only 57 percent of the eligible scoresheets were filed.
Id. at 169.
193. W. RicH, supra note 167, at 117.
194. MINN.STAT. § 244.11 (Supp. 1984); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781 (Purdon 1982).
195. State's Sentencing Rules Lead to Longer, More Uniform Terms, 15 CR1M. JUST.
NEWSLETTER 5, 6 (June 15, 1984) [hereinafter Sentencing Rules].
196. Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota Has and Has Not Accomplishe4
68 JUDICATURE 181, 189 (Oct.-Nov., 1984).
197. Id. at 183.

198.

STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

§ 2.3 commentary at

47 (1968).
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reasonably severe and should be changed." 9 This type of feedback is
necessary if the guidelines are descriptive, and useful to makers of prescriptive guidelines who may wish to reevaluate aspects of the guidelines which
are consistently questioned by these deviations.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR WYOMING

If judicial guidelines are accepted as an appropriate avenue for sentencing reform, three major steps must be undertaken. First, the guidelines
must be developed. Second, the form of implementation must be selected.
Third, some type of enforcement device must be established. The following sections offer some suggestions regarding each of these steps by
discussing the matrix model normally developed for guidelines. Four
features of the model, the offense score (which is placed on one axis), the
offender score (placed on the other), the individual cells (which contain
a presumptive sentence), and the dispositional line (running through the
matrix cells and determining the "in/out" decision will be the focus of
the discussion.
Developing Guidelines
The first step in developing guidelines is to determine whether they
should be descriptive or prescriptive. Even if descriptive guidelines do
accurately reflect an "average" sentence for the past few years, it is an
outcome resulting from several different sentencing philosophies applied
in various fashions by different judges. In addition, instead of rectifying
past injustices and biases, the descriptive guideline institutionalizes
them. 20 0 Prescriptive guidelines, on the other hand, do not merely reflect
an average of past sentences imposed pursuant to four different goals.
They can reflect a single explicit policy or an articulated priority of a
number of policies. Prescriptive guidelines should be developed for Wyoming. Although the legislature could institute such guidelines it is not
necessary for the legislature to act. The Wyoming Supreme Court, acting
20 1
under its general supervisory power, could adopt sentencing guidelines.
Developing prescriptive guidelines means that a goal of sentencing
must be adopted as the basis of the guidelines. The policy goals of any
Wyoming guidelines would, of course, be circumscribed by the constitutional provision that "[tihe penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and prevention."' 20 2 "Reformation and prevention"
has been interpreted by the Wyoming Supreme Court to include all four
of the major goals of sentencing. 22 Therefore any one of the four goals
199. See Sentencing Rules, supra note 195, at 6.
200. Knapp, Guidelines for SentencingReform: MinnesotaExperience, 7 STATE
JOURNAL

COURT

12 (Sum. 1983).

201. Although the legislature has been urged to adopt sentencing guidelines it has failed
to do so. See Roberts, supra note 3. This does not impair the supreme court's ability to adopt
guidelines in order to facilitate review under the abuse of discretion standard.
202. WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
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could serve as a basis for Wyoming guidelines. A single-goal guideline
system would, however, conflict with the constitution unless it can achieve
both reformation and prevention.
A single-goal system would conflict with the constitution, but a multigoal system with priority given to the goals deemed more important would
not. Currently in Wyoming, there is no explicit policy to guide judges.
Every judge is an independent policy-maker who can apply different
theories of punishment and prioritize goals in each case. Prescriptive
guidelines would not implement goals that are not already in use, but
would maintain the same order of priority from case to case.104 If placing
a different priority on the goals of sentencing in each case is within the
bounds of the constitution, then creating guidelines based upon prioritizing goals should also be within the constitution's parameters.
Judicially created guidelines must also comport with current legislation. As previously noted, the legislature has only provided (1) a very flexible policy statement that sentences should be indeterminate, and (2) a
correspondingly broad range for specific offenses. 0 5 Legislative intent
could be accommodated by developing a different grid for each class of
offense with the criteria for classification being the sentence range provided by the legislature. 00 Different offenses within each grid can then
be assigned values according to their perceived seriousness.
Offense Score
The offense score should reflect the seriousness of the offense as it
was committed. The offenses within each classification grid can be assigned point values based on the estimated harmfulness of the offense.
If the offense score is determined solely by the value assigned to the offense, as defined by the statute, then the guidelines fail to acknowledge
that the same "offense" can be more serious when committed under different circumstances. The offense score can more accurately reflect the
seriousness of the offender's actions if it includes a number of other factors which are also assigned point values.
An example of how the offense score might work in Wyoming is provided by using the "class" of crimes which have been assigned a sentence
range of five to twenty-five years. Aggravated robbery,207 aggravated
burglary, 20 8 and aggravated blackmail 2 9 are all within this class. Although
each may carry the same sentence, under usual circumstances aggravated
204. The guidelines would not be a method to insure that every judge would treat the
same case in exactly the same way because judges would still be free to deviate from the
presumptive sentence if they could justify the deviation. There would thus be some cases
in which a judge may feel that a deviation was appropriate when another judge would not.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
206. This type of borrowing has, however, been attacked by commentators. See, e.g.,
Von Hirsch, supra note 173, at 216.
207. WYo. STAT. § 6-2-401(c) (June, 1983 replacement).
208. Id. § 6-3-301(c).
209. Id. § 6-2-402(c).
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robbery may be deemed more serious than the other two, and so it should
be assigned a higher point value. Under certain circumstances, however,
each crime may be considered to be more serious than it normally is.
Therefore factors which are deemed to make a crime more serious, but
which do not raise the actions to a higher offense, can also constitute part
of the offense score. For example, the actual use of a weapon may be given
a point value. Special vulnerability of the victim may also be considered
an appropriate indicator making the usual offense more serious. Thus, an
offender who commits aggravated robbery by brandishing a firearm in
the presence of an eighty year old victim is given a much higher offense
score than the offender who enters a warehouse, and recklessly causes
the security guard to suffer a bloody nose, when he slams the door in the
guard's face while making a hasty exit.
Offender Score
The offender score consists primarily of the past history of the
offender."' Its range begins with a first time offender and ends with the
offender whose past history qualifies him as an habitual offender under
the Wyoming statutes."' Although there are a number of factors which
can be used to determine the total offender score, there are two primary
considerations. The first is whether any type of social stability factor
should be a part of the offender score, or whether past criminal history
should be the sole criterion. The second consideration is the weight that
the offender score should have in determining the presumptive sentences
in relation to the offense score.
If the policy of sentencing is determined to be solely retribution, then
social stability factors should be excluded from the offender score. On the
other hand, if the guidelines are based primarily on incapacitation or
rehabilitation, then social factors such as age, employment, and drug
history should be part of the offender score."' A middle ground can also
be chosen. Maryland's guidelines provide such a middle ground. The
Maryland guidelinesdo not include a social stability value in the offender
score. Instead they allow "social stabilty" to be a valid mitigating factor
in explaining a deviation from the presumed sentence. 13 The weight assigned to social stability factors in relation to that assigned to the criminal
history should be a reflection of the primary policy goal of sentencing.
The policies of rehabilitation and special deterrence would favor a heavier
emphasis on the social stability score than would the policies of general
deterrence and incapacitation.
The weight assigned to the offender score in relation to the offense
score should also be a reflection of the primary policy goal. If the goal
210. Von Hirsch, supra note 173, at 237. Both the frequency and seriousness of past
offenses should be considered. Id at 239. Some desert theorists believe that prior offenses
are irrelevant because the person was already punished for the prior offense. Id at 218, citing
G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 460-66 (1978).
211. WYo. STAT. § 6-10-201 (June, 1983 replacement).
212. Von Hirsch, supra note 173, at 233.
213. Levin, supra note 175, at 179-80.
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is primarily punishment, the offender score should, at most, be a modest
factor. 14 Under a policy of specific deterrence and incapacitation based
on the prediction that prior history is the strongest single indicator of
recidivism, the offender score should influence sentences to a greater extent than should the offense score. 15 This is because guidelines based on
a policy of punishment are most concerned with the offender's latest actions, while guidelines based on incapacitation and rehabilitation are concerned with predicting the offender's future behavior. Emphasis on one
of the scores is reflected in the sentence variations within the grid.
Presumptive Sentence
The cells of a guideline matrix must contain a presumptive sentence
range so that indeterminacy may be maintained. An indeterminate
sentence places discretion in the parole board. Discretion in the parole
board can also help to reduce disparity. Balancing the discretionary power
among those responsible for administering criminal sanctions is a method
to reduce disparity.2 16 The individual cells would range, of course, from
the minimum sentence provided by the legislature for the class of crime
to the maximum for the same.
The order in which the cells increase, (i.e., whether the increase in
sentences is steeper as the offense score increases or whether it is steeper
as the offender score increases) should be determined by the sentencing
goal. If punishment is the primary goal, then the increases should be
steeper along the offense axis. If incapacitation or rehabilitation is of maximum importance, then the increases should be steeper along the offender
axis.
DispositionalLine
The dispositional line, which represents the inlout decision, can serve
a number of functions. First, it can be used to control the total number
of offenders that will be sentenced to incarceration. 7 Minnesota's
guidelines placed a high priority on control of prison space,2 1 8 and if the
same concern is deemed a major priority for Wyoming, then the dispositional line should be adjusted accordingly. On the other hand, if deterrence is a more important goal, then the certainty of punishment must
be reflected by the dispositional line.21 9 Placing the dispositional line at
a point which would incarcerate a high percentage of offenders would send
the clear message, needed for general deterrence, that offenders will be
punished. Finally, the goal of incapacitation may also be achieved, to a
greater extent, by a low dispositional line. The position of the dispositional
line should be constantly adjusted as the sentencing goals of the state
change.
214. Von Hirsch, supra note 173, at 240.
215. Id at 240-41.

216. J.MILLER, supra note 166, at 43.
217. Von Hirsch, supra note 173, at 220-26.
218. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 244.09 (Supp. 1984).
219. Bayley, supra note 15, at 547-48.
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Implementation
What may be even more important than the guidelines themselves
is the manner in which they are implemented. It seems clear that voluntary guidelines at best only eliminate the very excessive and lenient
sentences. Although voluntary guidelines may be accepted initially, it appears that when the sentencing judge realizes that the "average" sentence
does not equal his own norms, he will refuse to change his old practice
and will refuse to sentence by the guidelines. 210 Closely aligned with this
overall voluntary implementation is the "voluntary guideline" policy of
allowing the judge to deviate from the guideline's presumptive sentence
whenever he wishes. Certainly a system is not going to work if no one
follows it except when it is convenient. The Wyoming Supreme Court could
mandate the use of a guideline system through its supervisory powers .21
Enforcement
Once implemented, the guideline system must be enforced. Appellate
222
review has often been suggested as an appropriate aid to enforcement.
Such a system should present no problems to the Wyoming Supreme Court
because the court currently will review any sentence for an abuse of
discretion.2 2 3 Therefore guidelines would not increase the number of appeals. In fact, guidelines would facilitate review because the court would
base its review on whether the sentence is within the established guidelines
and, if there is a deviation, then whether the deviation is justified.
Review under the guidelines will be clearer. The standard could still
be labeled abuse of discretion, but with guidelines the standard would now
have some teeth. Deviations from the presumed range should be allowed
since a model obviously cannot duplicate every possible set of circumstances. Any deviation must be accompanied by a written statement
explaining the deviation. If the reason
justifies the deviation then there
22 4
would be no abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION

A sentence is currently imposed in Wyoming by a judge who has been
given little legislative guidance for performing such an important task.
The judge has been told by the Wyoming Supreme Court that he can rely
on any of four goals in imposing a sentence. He has not been told which
of the four goals must be given priority or that he must consistently emphasize the same goal in similar cases. Such a system has, of course, led
220. Carrow, supra note 189, at 165.
221. WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 2. The court has already held that this provision gives them
the power to review any sentence imposed. State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P.2d 14
(1927).
222. See Carrow, supra note 189, at 171; Knapp, supra note 196, at 183.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 37-117 for a discussion of the current standard
for review of sentences.
224. Note that the reason for deviation would have to be something not already accounted
for by the guidelines, otherwise the guidelines would be susceptible to manipulation whenever
the sentencing judge decided they did not comport with his views.
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to sentences which can be justified only by applying the most lax standard of review. This standard of appellate review has produced only
piecemeal guidance which has been both confusing and contradictory.
Without clearer guidelines under which the reasonableness of a sentence
can be judged, there is little possibility of demonstrating an abuse of
discretion,225 and the review of sentencing decisions itself appears
arbitrary.
Explicit guidelines can be developed and implemented by the Wyoming judiciary within the current framework provided by the Wyoming
penal code. These guidelines, if mandatory and enforced through appellate
review, could reduce disparity between districts, lead to a rationale sentencing policy, and provide a real basis for striking down the excessive
sentence. Guidelines would actually promote the policy of individualizing criminal justice" by insuring that the sentencing process includes
consideration of individualizing factors in each case. Emphasis should be
on the unique circumstances of each individual case, not on the unique
disposition of each judge. 2 7
MICHAEL BARRASH AND DAVID

225. JAHNKE V. STATE, 682 P.2d 991, 1008-09 (Wyo. 1984).
226. PETERSON V. STATE, 586 P.2d 144, 157 (Wyo. 1978); DANIEL
178-79 (Wyo. 1982).
227. BEAULIEU V. STATE, 608 P.2d 275, 276 (Wyo. 1980).
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